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One of the most important components of preparing and conducting military (convencional) and 
peace support operations is the support of the operations, and it’s effectiveness is highly affected by 
the distance of the supporting forces and equipments from the forces which are participating in the 
actual operation. In favor of the supporting forces, equipments and services’ effective availability, 
we can create military objects and camps outside the garrison’s area for the housing of the units 
providing the life – and working conditions for them. The defence level of a military camp depends 
on various factors, and that level can be different within the limits of the camp, and it has strong 
connections with the camp’s physical defence and it’s reinforcement. 
My aim is to provide a short overview about the opportunities of the military camp’s physical 
defences. 
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A katonai táborok fizikai védelme 
 
A háborús és nem háborús katonai műveletek előkészítésének és végrehajtásának egyik 
legfontosabb összetevője a műveletek támogatása, melynek hatékonyságát nagyban befolyásolja a 
támogató erők, eszközök távolsága a műveletben résztvevő erőktől. A támogató erők, eszközök, 
szolgáltatások hatékony elérhetőségének érdekében, a helyőrségen kívül a csapatok elhelyezésére, 
élet- és munkafeltételeinek biztosítására szolgáló katonai objektumokat, táborokat hozhatunk létre. 
Egy adott katonai tábor védelmi szintje több tényezőtől függ, a védelmi szint a táboron belül is 
eltérő lehet, melyhez szorosan kapcsolódik a tábor fizikai védelme, annak kiépítési szintje. 
Célom egy rövid áttekintés nyújtása a katonai táborok területének fizikai védelmi lehetőségeiről. 
KULCSSZAVAK: katonai tábor, fizikai védelem, tábor zónái 
 
Introduction 
The military camp’s appearence stretches back to the very past. During the passing eras the 
designs, aims and implements, the quality of the camps because of the developing 
infrasturcture have changed a lot of course. Even today there are significant differences 
between diffenent nations’ camps. Despite these, the past eras’ and today’s camp-founding 
principles are the same:2 
  to provide the housing and storing of soldiers, armaments and technical equipments; 
 to provide living conditions; 
 to create the conditions to hold trainings and preparations; 
 to provide the infrastructural background of daily routine, leading and controlling; 
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 to handle the camp’s security, physical defence and repelling the attaks. 
In favor of the military camps’ optimal security a security system needs to be installed 
and operated, which defence capability depends on the required defence level in that area. 
A military camp’s defence level depends on multiple factors, which you have to keep in 
mind during the planning phase:3 
 the nature and duration of the operation, excercise; 
 the intensity and quality of the dangers; 
 the size, mission and organization of the units stationed there; 
 host nation support; 
 geographical factors; 
 composition of the forces stationed in the camp (national, joint, host);  
 other factors (political, health and pandemic, etc.). 
Setting and equiping the camps are regulated by numerous – NATO, UN, national 
etc.– manuals, which have to be (should be) extended by the gained experiences. 
With the end of the bipolar world, a new environment was born. Based on terrorism, 
assimetrical warfare and the non-controlled spreading of the WMD-s (proliferation) 
smaller in size, but more complex life-threatening elements have appeared. As 
conventional warfare took the back seat armies had to rethink the operations’ way of 
support from all sides, such as the military camps’ defence and equipment. 
 
Principles 
During the setting up phase (speaking of camps), the commanders on the spot have more 
responsibility as they have to measure the local security situation and determine, control 
the needed safety/defence capabilities.4 
Tha aim of the camp’s defence is to lower the probability of undesirable events during 
the support/rest periods, and if these undesirable events happen to occur, moderate the 
consequences (caused damage, injury, etc.), grant us opportunity to stabilize the security 
and order, go through the transition period just after the attack, reorganization, rebuilding. 
One of the principles of building military camps is the creation of different areas, 
called „zones”. There are generally three well seperated zones:5 
(1) Buffer Zone 
It is important to easily seperate the military camp from the nature, and from the 
buffer zone designated around it. This zone is the unbuilt area just around the camp, this is 
the primary protection zone. The extension of this well cleared area makes the approach 
harder for the enemy without being compromised, as well as the „smuggling” of 
undesirable equipments, materials within the camp, or just near it. 
The size of this zone depends on the actual security level, and on the objective 
opportunites. The well selected depth of the zone will shelter us against the attacks carried 
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out with explosives, and also this is the most effective against them. The well set area 
carried out by security aspects will highly rise the defence capabilites of the camp itself.6 
(2) The camp 
This is the second zone, which primary security line is the outer ring of 360 degrees. 
From the aspect of defence and security, the clear, large/deep, well-lit and well-seen 
areas should be prefered. The professionally engineered build-up of the camp, the use of 
more security equipments will rise de defence capabilites even more. 
(3) Inner security Zone 
For the high-value facilites placed within the camp, it is essential to create an inner 
zone which is well-reinforced. This area is deep in the camp, far away from the perimeter 
and dangers, defended by another line of security equipments and proceedings. 
 
Area of the military camp 
Designating the proper area for setting up a military depends on various elements. But 
choosing the best place for the camp has a positive effect both on the defence capabilites 
and on the forces’ operational effectiveness. In the introduction, several factors had been 
mentioned, which determine the camp’s level of defence.7 Obviously we have to keep in 
mind those factors in the first place during the designation of the area of the future camp, 
but we have to watch for these factors as well: 
 cover and concealment of the camp; 
 avenues of approach; 
 opportunity for setting up inner security zones; 
 available (useable) materials, equipments quality and quantity on the spot; 
 useable local infrastructure (buildings, gas, water, sewage, eletricity, híradó 
communication network, etc.); 
 expenses of the construction and sustainment. 
 
Accessibility 
The defence capabilites can be raised, if we keep up the status quo between the 
obstructions used for slowing, stoping the enemy and the limits of our forces’ 
manueverability during the planning of the the avenues of approach. 
Using more entry-points grants the friendly forces greater mobility, and grants 
opportunity to select and seperate those, who enter, and leave the camp, but also let a 
higher chance for the undesireable material and personel to get inside unnoticed. If we 
reduce the number of the entries, it will significantly raise the entry time, and also has a 
negative effect on the forces’ mobility, which may create dangerous situations. 
The quick, unchecked approches can get harder, if we leave behind the building of 
perpendicular roads to the camp’s „wall”. 
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Whichever solution we choose for the avenues of approach, the most important is to 
maintain total control all the time over the approches, entries, exits and the surrounding 
area.8 
The disturbing, dead spot-generating vegetation, and uneven ground should be 
terminated. If it is not possible, the long, dense vegetated areas has to rarefied. 
More administrative defence measurements can help controlling the approaches 
towards the camp. Several traffic signs, speed breaker obstructions (such as „s” turns) help 
identifying those who want to enter illegally, grants opportunity for the security forces to 
survey the suspicious vehicles better, and to perform security measurements if needed.9 
The most important elements of a camp in according to approaches and entries, are the 
checkpoints, which grant the security forces chance to control the traffic, conduct 
administration, hold off persons and materials without permission to enter. Checkpoints 
also good for the demonstration of military forces in the area. 
 
Security mechanical equipments 
The various counter-mobility mechanical equipments are inevitable parts of the camp’s 
security. I would like to highlight those, which are used most of the time, as there are many 
different versions and types for them. 
The reinforced concrete bypass elements’ (T-wall, Jersey wall) cross section is 
trapeze-shaped, it looks like a letter-„T” upside down. The height can differ, starting from 
0.8 meter to few meters.10 Installing them next to each other, can be a good way to close, 
control, or to „herd” the traffic. Mandatory directions, or closed areas can be easily 
designated and signed. These elements can be used without proper founding and fixing, so 
it is possible to quickly redeploy them if the situation demands it. Fixed and founded 
versions are also available. That version raises the defence capability, but reduces the 
mobility. 
For bypassing, and detouring the traffic, HESCO bastions can be used aswell.11 These 
are being produced based on a MIL standard. The standard lets twelve different sizes to 
use, which can be applied as a modular obstacle system. The elements are welded, 
galvanized nets made of steel wires. The problem of connection is solved with vertical 
spiralic coils and fixing spikes. It’s frame is a strong steel net, which can be opened and 
closed like an accordion. There is a thick polypropylene geotextile fixed onto the web, so it 
can be easily filled up with the local soil, rocks, sand, or whatever material that can be 
found on the spot. By pulling the spikes out, the filled material can be removed, so the 
HESCO can be used later again. 
The steel and reinforced concrete anti-tank obstacles, such as the so called „dragon’s 
teeth”, similar to the lower T-walls, are being used to designate and seperate the closed 
areas from the traffic. Based on it’s size and weight, they can be easily and quickly 
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installed, and very mobile. The different hindering obstacles, such as mobile and fixed 
spikes prevent the undesirable enter into the inner area of the camp. 
The simple, man-operated opening and closing barriers at the gates cannot stop the 
vehicles, they are used for visual warnings: warn the driver to slow down, there will be an 
inspection, or has to stop for any other reason. If the gate is an icreased security point, it is 
a good idea to use stronger, more massive barriers.12 
For the control of the pedastrians, or to hinder their movement – beside the ones 
written before – different barbed wires and fences can be used with good effect. 
The rapid-deployment wire is a sharp, nailed, coil of wire which is tensile. It was 
designed to transport in a compact form, and can be deployed as an accordion being pulled 
apart. The tensile wire’s size determines the diameter and streching capability. The 
diameter is usually beteween 50-110 cm, and it’s lenght can be streched until 10-12 meters. 
By using fixing parts, the coils can be placed next to, or onto each other. 
The fences belong to the 360 security. Speaking of defence capability, these can be 
used in a wide spectrum starting from visual warnings to hindering osbtacles against heavy 
vehicles. It depends on the technical realization and the budget available.13 
They can be made of steel concrete, reinforced concrete, wood, plastic or stone 
fences(walls). The shape and look of these are based on the security standards, and on the 
human fantasy. The advantage of these fances is simple: beside the basic duty, they can be 
mounted with additional technical tools and equipments, which raise the defence 
capabilities even more. These tools can be security-electronical devices, tools used for 
concealment so visual reconnaissance might get more difficult or other devices, which are 
required for the local area.14 
 
Guardposts and emplacements 
Built up camps, which area are properly chosen, fulfill the requirements of the optimal 
security level, mounted with other devices, still have to have more critical elements: the 
guardposts, the observing posts, and the (firing) encampments. 
These can be set up well covered, or demonstrative way, it depends on the aim of the 
installing. During the planning and building phase, commanders have to take a good care 
for these towers, guardposts around the outer ring, at the checkpoints, next to the roads 
leading towards the camp, and in the inner ring. 
Against grenades and rockets, thick, wired webs can be used, and against rifles, inner 
covering/concealing elements are optimal within the towers, with good observation 
opportunity. For the better observation effectiveness, the observation posts should be 
raised, and used that way, so the soldier on duty can see further. 
Depending on the current situation, and materials available, different types of 
observation and guardposts, emplacements can be installed, but all of them have a criteria 
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of appropriate defense against enemy fire from the front and from the flanks. Besides, the 
individuals using these elements have to have a good view towards outside, with 
opportunity to (return) fire. 
Speaking of materials, they can be various, but the previously mentioned HESCO 
elements are frequently used. Concrete or wooden beams and stringers also can be used for 
the edifice, but has a negative effect of generating fragments after direct hit or explosion. 




It is appropriate to install facilites planned for larger numbers within the inner security 
zone of a camp. If it is possible, larger security distances should be used between zones 
and other important camp facilites. 
An already existing building can be reinforced post factum, it’s defence capability can 
be raised, it all depends on the aim of future use. Using glasses in buildings where soldiers 
can be frequently found have to be minimized (fregmentation), otherwise special glass 
material and insulation is needed.15 
The roof needs to be reinforced against incoming projectiles from above, or has to 
rebuild them. The easiest and most effective solution for this is doubling the roof. The 
outer part activates, or slows the projectile down, so the inner roof 1.5 m beneath it will 
repel the debris. 
For further security effectiveness, the large areas should be partitioned with space 
divider elements, which could be one-layer thick, or could be multilayer dividers, not to 
mention the ones filled with well graded materials. Wooden, steel, plastic or fiber elements 
filled with sand is another option.  
For maximizing the security, the military camp’s zones should be divided into inner 
and outer zones, too. As far as possible, mechanical defences from different sort of levels 
should be used and mounted in these new areas. Against unexpected attacks, it is worth to 
construct inside easily approachable shelters on various points against explosions, 
fragments and projectiles using steep trajectoriy. If the security level demands, and we 
have the opportunity, constructing shelters providing high levels of defence needs to be 
considered. 
 
Inner security zones 
According to the Hungarian definition of critical infrastructures,16 the camps’ cruical 
elements can be stated as: 
Those  facilities, systems, services in the camp, whiches significant damage, 
malfunction or destruction followed by serious consequences for the safety of the forces, 
conducting of operations, nature and the effective leading. 
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For the camps’ cruical elements defined above, the creation of inner security zones is 
inevitable. These elements can be command posts, casualty collection points, 
communication stations, electric-, water-, gas support systems, and other utility systems 
main elements, facilities, security posts, shelters, etc.17 
To defend these elements, special reinforcing facilities needs to be constructed, 
whiches fulfill the required security level, and secure the defended element to continue 
operating, even in special situations. 
We can secure the special reinforced buildings’ security capabilities by: 
 their chosen place according to the ground: 
o on surface; 
o mid-surface; 
o underground; 
 using building structures with appropriate load carrier ability; 
 using security and mechanical equipment; 
 using security systems ( such as safety valves, sluice-systems, air-filter systems); 
 vibration dampers, radiation and electromagnetic pulse proof safety systems; 
 separating entrances and utility systems;  
 providing reserve systems. 
The same security level is required for the camp’s cruical elements’ continuous 
operation. For example, the camp’s power supply needs to be doubled by a reserve system. 
Also, uninterruptible power supplies are mandatory elements too. For a command post, it is 
important to separate it’s utility systems from the camp’s systems (electricity, water, gas) 
so it can operate even in case of camp-wide malfunction. 
To save these cruical elements and systems, the inner security zones need to be 
guarded within the camp too. The defence capability can be raised by enclosing the area, 
installing entry points or checkpoints, constructing inner guard towers and observation 
posts, and the use of cover and concealment against direct visibility from outside. 
 
Summary 
It can be seen that building a military camp requires an extensive cooperation between 
different professions, and the person who coordinates and responsible for all of this is the 
commander of the forces using the base. 
This writing is only scratching a theoretical part of the defence of military camps. We 
should know it is not enough to be familiar with different specializations (risk calculation, 
military specializations, security, law, administration, etc.), we have to know these 
branches’ connections, and their places in the complex system of defence. 
It must be highlighted, that even the best planned, built, and defended security system 
alone cannot work with serious effectivenes. It needs the operators and other users, whose 
optional training is inevitable for the military objects’ proper operating. 
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